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With the worldwide financial market confusion caused by the subprime 
mortgage problem and the increase in credit line contracts with relaxed 
covenants, there are cases where financial institutions are facing demands to 
provide additional credit to securitized vehicles with heightened liquidity and 
credit risks. These are typical examples demonstrating the importance of risk 
management considering variations in exposure. There are also calls for 
incorporation of future variations in exposure into the model for the Basel II 
advanced internal ratings-based approach. This paper adopts commitment lines 
as a credit provision with variable exposure and constructs a credit risk model 
whereby stochastic new borrowing demand is linked to changes in a firm’s 
asset value. Through simulations, the paper then considers the interdependence 
among exposure at default, probability of default, loss given default, expected 
loss, and unexpected loss. The paper also prepares a simple model for the 
covenants, and verifies the influence of the rigidness of covenants on expected 
loss and other risk factors. 
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1. Introduction 
The subprime mortgage problem, which became more severe during 2007, has 
triggered confusion in worldwide financial markets. It is also exerting diverse influences 
on financial institutions that do not directly hold such loans. For example, some types of 
financial vehicles, which invested in securitized subprime mortgages,
1 depended  on 
ABCP for part of their fundraising; as the ABCP has become difficult to roll over, these 
vehicles have made use of large sums of supplementary liquidity facilities (backup 
lines) from certain European and US banks. As a result of unexpected liquidity 
provision, banks’ balance sheets are suddenly expanding. In some cases, this strains the 
funding of the banks themselves, and the provision of credit to entities with heightened 
credit risk is resulting in massive losses. These cases illustrate just how important it is 
for financial institutions to manage risk stemming from variations in exposure 
beforehand. 
There are also calls for the Basel II framework to mandate the evaluation of credit 
risk considering exposure variations. The first pillar of the Basel II accord requires the 
measurement of credit risk, market risk, and operational risk in the computation of 
capital adequacy for risk assets (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision [2005a, 
2005b]). Among these, banks must choose one of three methods for the measurement of 
credit risk: the standardized approach, the foundation internal ratings-based approach, 
and the advanced internal ratings-based approach. Banks that choose the advanced 
internal ratings-based approach must estimate the values of three factors that determine 
the amount of losses: probability of default (PD), loss given default (LGD), and 
exposure at default (EaD). 
A great deal of research has already been conducted on PD and LGD, and progress 
has been achieved in the development of models. In contrast, for EaD almost all of the 
research substitutes exposure at the time when credit risk is evaluated, and only a few 
studies such as Moral [2006], Yamashita and Yoshiba [2007], and Kupiec [2007] 
address exposure variations through maturity. 
                                                 
1 The SPCs known as ABCP conduits are one example. ABCP conduits use CP and other relatively 
short-term fundraising and invest in diverse securitized products. Banks provide these SPCs with 
securitized products, and provide supplementary liquidity facilities when issuing ABCP.   2
Typical examples of exposure variation include (i) derivatives,
2  (ii) bills, housing 
loans, and other instruments whose principal is repaid in installments (including 
prepayments, etc.), (iii) additional loans, and (iv) commitment lines. Among these, 
additional loans and commitment lines require a credit risk evaluation model that 
assumes changes in exposure because their risk is expected to increase via increases in 
exposure. Especially with commitment lines, banks cannot control their exposure, 
because banks must passively provide new loans in response to firms’ execution for 
withdrawal rights obtained in compensation for commission fees. Accordingly, banks 
set covenants beforehand to prevent increases in exposure to firms with heightened 
credit risk. For covenants, banks use a combination of multiple conditions that can be 
observed and easily verified, such as the worsening of a given financial variable beyond 
a given level. Recently there has been an increase in so-called “covenants light” 
contracts with comparatively loose waiver clauses in European and US lending markets, 
and such lending has resulted in a stronger need for risk management. 
Chart 1 presents the credit limits and amount drawn down under commitment lines in 
Japan. The credit limits have consistently risen since 2001, and are now approaching 30 
trillion yen. The drawn down amount remained around two trillion yen through mid-









                                                 
2 For example, the exposure in interest rate swaps is zero at the contract date, but the exposure then 
stochastically changes to positive or negative with subsequent changes in the yield curve, to be 
precise, the six-month forward rate curve.   3












Source: Bank of Japan
Note: Figures cover city banks, trust banks, Saitama Resona Bank,
          Shinsei Bank, Aozora Bank, Regional Banks, and Regional Banks II.
 
This paper considers commitment lines, whose market scale has expanded in recent 
years, and aims to present an example of a credit risk model that incorporates stochastic 
changes in exposure. The model also incorporates the effect of covenants on credit risks. 
The paper constructs a credit risk model whereby new loan demand changes 
stochastically in association with changes in a firm’s asset value, i.e., a determinant 
factor of its PD, and evaluates the credit risk of commitment lines under conditions 
whereby there are correlations between EaD, PD, and LGD. 
While more detailed verification based on the data of individual companies is, of 
course, necessary to confirm the appropriateness of the model and the parameter 
settings, the investigations focus on the following points using simple model settings 
and simulations through which cause–effect relations can easily be confirmed. 
I.  What interdependence exists among EaD, PD, and LGD? 
II.  What influence is consequently exerted on expected loss (EL) and unexpected 
loss (UL)? 
III. How does credit risk change with the rigidness of covenants, and what factors 
affect its optimal settings? 
Major findings and quantitative examinations are as follows. 
I.  Credit risk tends to increase with exposure to the firm whose new loan demand   4
rises when its asset value declines. Positive correlation between EaD and PD in 
the model describes this result. 
II.  Covenants that prevent uncontrollable increases in exposure to poor performing 
firms are useful for limiting credit risk. In some cases, lax covenants can lead to 
greater losses, and this largely depends on the structure of how changes in a 
firm’s asset value lead to new loan demand. 
III. Consequently, verifying this structure is important for controlling credit risk 
when providing commitment lines and setting covenants. 
IV. There is a covenants level that optimizes the trade-off between the increase in 
loan interest earnings and the increase in EL. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Chapter 2 presents prior studies 
addressing exposure variations. Chapter 3 first presents an overview of commitment 
lines, and then attempts to create a model for stochastic loan demand via commitment 
lines, using the financial data of individual firms. By linking changes in a firm’s asset 
value to changes in loan demand, a Merton-type structural model, which can be 
generally used to evaluate credit risk, is applied. Chapter 4 evaluates the credit risk of 
commitment lines using a Monte Carlo simulation, and considers the optimal covenant 
settings for banks. Chapter 5 concludes the paper with a summary of the findings. 
 
2. Prior Research on Exposure Variationsç
This chapter presents an overview of three research papers that address variations in 
exposure: Moral [2006], Yamashita and Yoshiba [2007], and Kupiec [2007]. 
(1) Moral [2006]ç
Moral decomposes EaD: 
) ( t T t T E L LEQ E EaD − + = ,  (1)
where  t E  is the exposure at time t, L is the credit limit of the commitment line a bank 
sold at/before  0 = t , and  T LEQ  is the percentage of the commitment line used from 
time  t   to default date T   relative to the unused commitment line at time t. Moral 
attempts to estimate the unknown LEQ (loan equivalent), and attempts to derive EaD at   5
time T. Specifically, Moral introduces the following three simplified methods. 
(i) Simple average of the observed values 
We consider the LEQ over the coming year. First we collect data on default firms 
whose commitment lines have similar properties, such as the firm’s industry and 
stand-by or revolving type (see Chapter 3 for details), and then calculates the actually 
observed LEQ from the EaD at the default date and exposure one year prior to 
default. The LEQ value is estimated to minimize the sum of the squares of the error 
between the observed LEQ and the estimated value (in other words, the simple 
average of the observed LEQ is taken as the LEQ estimated value.) 
(ii) Weighted average of the observed values 
While the above method treats all of the observed data equally, another approach 
is to weight the individual data by importance and then calculate the estimated value. 
For risk management, rather than knowing the future drawn down amount by parties 
that are already close to full draw down of their commitment line, it is more 
important to know the future draw down by parties that still have a large amount of 
unused line. In this case, the weighted average of the LEQ values can be adopted as 
the estimated LEQ. One method for computing the weighted average is to use the 
square of the unused portion as the weight. 
(iii) Minimization of the loss function 
The damage from wrong risk management estimates is different between the cases 
of an overestimate and an underestimate of the potential amounts of withdrawal. One 
way to address this is to incorporate a large penalty for underestimating the drawn 
down amounts of commitment lines when estimating the LEQ. As an application 
example, Moral points to the estimation of minimum capital requirements, using an 
asymmetrical evaluation function that assigns larger weights for underestimating the 
minimum capital requirements. Assuming that there is no estimation error for PD or 
LGD, the estimation error for minimum capital requirements results solely from the 
EaD estimation error. The estimated LEQ is then found by minimizing the evaluation 
function.
3 
                                                 
3 When there are estimation errors in PD or LGD, or when they are time variable, this is reflected in   6
 
(2) Yamashita and Yoshiba [2007]ç
Yamashita and Yoshiba examine the conditions where the bank supplies additional 
loans to minimize the expected loss, and analytically evaluate how the new loan affects 
EL and UL.
4 
They assume that a firm’s asset value follows a geometric Brownian motion, and that 
banks can provide additional loans at specific points in time. Defaults by the firm occur 
when its asset value is less than its liabilities at loan maturity. Under these model 
settings, additional loans are made in two opposite cases. The first is the low asset value 
case in which the new loan contributes to a decline in PD. The second is the high asset 
value case in which the new loan contributes to an increase in interest income. The 
paper also notes that when additional loans are provided following the principle of 
minimizing EL, UL conversely rises, and highlights the undetected risk in the case of a 
bank decision made only on the expected value.  
 
(3) Kupiec [2007] 
The Basel II formula for calculating minimum capital requirements in the first pillar 
takes EaD and LGD as given and makes the calculation using an asymptotic single risk 
factor (ASRF) model. On the other hand, there are empirical analyses showing that PD, 
LGD, and EaD all grow larger during recessions.
5  Kupiec attempts to model these 
positive correlations among PD, LGD, and EaD. Specifically, Kupiec uses latent 
variables to determine a firm’s asset value, LGD and EaD, using a common factor and 
individual factors that follow normal distributions. The setup establishes the correlations 
among PD, LGD, and EaD through the common factor. Kupiec then derives the 
analytical solution for the portfolio loss rate under these model settings. However, 
                                                                                                                                               
the value of the LEQ estimate. Estimation methods for EaD alone instead of the minimum capital 
requirements may be desirable to avert such bias. 
4 UL is defined as the expected loss under stress (SEL) minus EL. See Chapter 4 for details. 
5  EaD apparently increases during recessions because funds demand rises as cash flow worsens 
under poor business performance. One reason why LGD increases during recessions is that for 
loans with collateral the value of the collateral declines during recessions, resulting in a lower 
recovery rate upon default. Pykhtin [2003] notes that ignoring the correlation between PD and LGD 
results in an underestimation of the credit risk.   7
Kupiec does not explicitly incorporate the cause of the variation in EaD such as changes 
in firm funds demand into the model, and simply introduces changes in EaD as a 
stochastic process. 
 
3. Commitment Lines and Funds Demand Model 
(1) Outline of commitment lines 
The law concerning commitment line agreements
6  defines commitment lines as a 
“contract between a bank and its corporate clients, which legally obliges the bank to 
extend loans to the clients upon their request up to the amount that is agreed at the time 
of the contract within the term of validity that is also agreed at the time of the contract. 
The contract grants corporate clients the right to withdraw any time within the term of 
validity any amount up to the limit designated in the contract. In return for the 
commitment, the bank receives a commitment fee.” 
More specifically, the characteristics of commitment line contracts can be 
summarized as follows.
7 
•   Corporate clients can borrow funds at any time within the credit limit. 
•   Commitment lines can be categorized into two basic types: stand-by lines of 
credit used as a backup for emergency cases such as when it becomes difficult to 
issue CP, and revolving lines of credit for borrowings during normal times. 
•   The loan interest rate is stipulated at the time of the contract as a specific rate or 
as a spread over a reference rate such as Tibor or the prime rate. 
•   Corporate clients pay a commitment fee on the credit line, or on the unused 
portion of the credit line. 
•   Banks sometimes set covenants in the contracts whereby they can refuse to 
provide loans under commitment lines, mainly based on the deterioration in 
                                                 
6 Operational since March 1999. With the implementation of this law, the use of commitment line 
contracts started to spread in Japan. This law stipulates that the commissions paid by borrowers 
under commitment line contracts are not regulated by the Interest Rate Restriction Law or the 
Capital Subscription Law. 
7 This list was mostly prepared referring to Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank International Finance Department 
[2001].   8
financial conditions of the corporate clients such as the capital ratio and the 
interest coverage ratio. 
 
(2) Factors determining funds demand 
Many studies have examined commitment lines, including Campbell [1978] and 
Martin and Santomero [1997], partly because the commitment line market developed 
long ago in the US. Those studies, however, are primarily concerned with the 
determination of the fair value of commission fees and do not focus on modeling funds 
demand as the motivation for drawing down new loans. Therefore, the simple 
assumptions of funds demand models are unsuitable for the credit risk valuation model 
that considers the developments in EaD. Specifically, many of the earlier models cannot 
express the partial use of credit and draw downs before maturity, because they make the 
simple assumption of full use of the commitment lines or no use at all, which is totally 
opposed to the concept of continuous stochastic changes in the EaD. To develop such a 
stochastic EaD, this paper begins by modeling new funds demand referring to the 
financial data of individual firms. 
This paper focuses on changes in a firm’s asset value as a factor determining funds 
demand. In general, funds demand is expected to increase when a firm’s asset value is 
rising, and vice versa. However, a firm’s asset value may rise when the firm improves 
its financial position, for example, through a reduction in borrowings. It would be the 
case that a firm’s asset value may also rise using debt leverage contrary to the financial 
restructuring. Thus, the relationship between a firm’s asset value and funds demand may 
vary by company and across time. Moreover, funds demand does not necessarily 
decrease when a firm’s asset value declines. There may be cases where funds demand 
rises because of temporary cash flow tightening or back out of certain business line 
incurring personnel restructuring costs. Because commitment lines are often contracted 
for working capital, it might be more appropriate to classify funds demand into funds 
for working capital and funds for capital investment; however, in this paper, for 
simplification we do not consider the use of funds. 
We begin by examining the relationship between a firm’s asset value and funds 
demand using financial data on individual firms. First, we observe annual changes in   9
total assets for a firm’s asset value and total liabilities for funds demand. Book values 
are used for both for convenience. For total assets, we do not adjust for market value 
using market capitalization to calculate total assets as the sum of liabilities and share 
value. That approach would actually make the relationship between liabilities and total 
assets even more difficult to grasp, as share prices are strongly influenced by other 
domestic and foreign financial assets and especially by stock markets in other 
industrialized countries, which have been becoming increasingly linked in recent years. 
The data source is the Development Bank of Japan, with figures for each fiscal year 
from FY 1999 through FY 2004. The figure covers firms in the real estate and 
construction sectors listed on the First Section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange. Firms in 
these industries have large changes in asset value and liabilities, and are said to have 
received their financial support from banks. Chart 2 presents the annual percent changes 
in total assets and total liabilities for each firm.  
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Note: A small number of observations could not be plotted within the graph boundaries. 
 
While Chart 2 indicates a strong positive correlation between the changes in total 
assets and liabilities, a considerable number of observations significantly deviate from 
the 45 degree line. The construction industry includes a substantial number of firms 
where liabilities increased while total assets declined, or where liabilities did not decline 
as much as total assets did. Conversely, liabilities of some firms below the 45 degree 
line in the third quadrant decreased more than total assets did. This might be a result of 
debt-equity swaps and write-offs of debt. Similar trends are observed in the real estate 
industry, but they are not as pronounced as in construction. 
Next, looking at the region where total assets increased, in many cases the increase 
was the result of greater debt leverage. That trend is observed especially in the 
construction industry. Conversely, there are some firms for which total assets increased 
by a smaller amount than their liabilities did. 
 
(3) Funds demand model 
We proceed to develop the model with the assumptions that changes in a firm’s asset 
value influence funds demand, that banks are providing adequate commitment lines, and 
that additional funds demand over the existing loan amount will be filled using the   11
commitment lines without contracting new loans. First we use a Merton-type structural 
model, that is, the standard credit risk model, to describe changes in a firm’s asset value. 
Specifically, a firm’s asset value  t A  follows the geometric Brownian motion shown in 
equation (2): 
1 , 1 t t t t dW A dt A dA σ µ + = ,  (2)
where µ and  1 σ  respectively represent the drift and the volatility in the firm’s asset 
value growth rate. The only liabilities are borrowings, and the liabilities at maturity will 
be the borrowings at the initial time  0 E  plus the loans drawn on the commitment line. 
Default occurs if the firm’s asset value falls under total liabilities at maturity. In that 
case, net liabilities become the loss at default. 
As for the timing of the drawing down, the period of time until maturity T is divided 
into n parts, and the timing is expressed as  t n t t t ∆ − ∆ ∆ = ) 1 ( ,...., 2 , , where  n T t / = ∆ . 
The amount of each new loan via the commitment line,  ) ( t t t t E E E ∆ − − ≡ ∆ , is modeled 
as: 
] 0 , 1 max[ } { t Ratio t E E
t ′ ∆ ⋅ = ∆ >α ,  (3)
and 
2 , 2 } 0 { } 0 { 1 1 t A t A t t t A D A D t b E
t t ε σ ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ = ′ ∆ < ∆ − ≥ ∆ + , (4)
where  {} ⋅ 1   is an indicator function with a value of 1 when the condition inside the 
parentheses {} is true, and value of 0 at all other times. Equation (4) for  t E′ ∆  represents 
the linkage of the stochastic changes in funds demand to the changes in a firm’s asset 
value. We assume that funds demand is  t A D ∆ +  when a firm’s asset value rises and 
t A D ∆ −   when a firm’s asset value declines. Even when  0 = ∆ t A , liabilities may be 
trending up or down, so the time trend term  t b∆   is included. Furthermore,  t E′  is 
expressed as a stochastic process with the probability term  2 , 2 t tε σ ∆ .  2 σ  represents 
volatility reflecting the uncertainty of funds demand and  2 , t ε   is a random variable 
following a standard normal distribution. The error terms in equation (2) and equation 
(4) are independent of each other. Equation (3) includes a MAX function because of the 
assumption that loans via the commitment line are not repaid until maturity time T. 
While liabilities could actually be reduced through repayment prior to maturity, this   12
assumption seems reasonable in the following sense. In general, loan terms seem to be 
determined in periods in which funding for a firm’s investments and business operations 
are stable. Unexpected increases in funding demand seem to be filled by the drawing 
down of the commitment line. Thus, the model in this paper targets credit risk valuation 
for a shorter period than the period reflecting long-term developments in loan amounts. 
When new loan demand  t E′ ∆  occurs, the entire amount is borrowed as long as it is 
within the line limits and the covenants are not violated. When there is conflict with the 
covenants, the request for new drawing downs is refused. As for covenants, the interest 
coverage ratio and other financial indices are commonly used. In this paper the market-
value basis capital ratio  t Ratio , (asset value – liabilities)/asset value, is adopted for the 
financial index referred to in covenants in order to incorporate the developments in  E ∆  
into the credit risk model. In short, commitment line loans are issued on demand only 
when the capital ratio exceeds α . 
The new loan makes a firm’s asset value and liabilities rise by the same amount. 
Thereafter, a firm’s asset value once again follows a geometric Brownian motion. 
Collateral is not considered, so the LGD becomes (liabilities – asset value) / liabilities. 
Chart 3 presents an image of the model. 
 
Chart 3: Exposure variation model image 
ççççççAsset value
Defaults do not occur
        ∆E
Default threshold
      ∆ E
          Initial liabilities   Loss amount
 Defaults occur
t        Maturity T
      Loan demand occurs    13
 
(4) Determination of  − + D D ,  
Section (3) presented a model incorporating changes in a firm’s asset value into 
stochastic development in funds demand via a commitment line. In this section, we 
consider the specification of parameters  + D  and  − D . The scatter diagram presented as 
Chart 4 uses the same data as in Chart 2, on an annual change basis, and scales the data 
with total assets in FY 1999 = 100. The histograms show the distribution of the slopes 
from the origin for these scaled annual change data. 
In the construction and the real estate industries, the distributions show a maximum 
slope of 1.0, regardless of whether  A ∆   is positive or negative. This leads to the 
hypotheses that “the values of  + D  and  − D  equal 1, and the presence of the stochastic 
term in equation (4) results in a distribution around the slope 1.” Looking at the slope 
distribution in detail, we see that when  A ∆  is positive the maximum is 1, but there tends 
to be a long tail toward the negative, especially for the real estate industry. In contrast, 
when  A ∆  is negative, the distribution is approximately symmetrical. 
With reference to these observations, this paper sets the value of  + D  at 1. On the 
other hand, the value of  − D  is set as 0 or negative under the assumption that “firms 
cannot restrain liabilities when their asset value is decreasing, and there are concerns 
that such firms may be forced to take on additional loans.” Such a hypothesis should 
properly be subjected to empirical analysis based on the individual company data with 
commitment line contracts. Because such data do not exist, this paper analyzes credit 
risk based on the above-stated hypothesis as the first step in the investigation of credit 
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4. Simulation Results 
The simulation adopts the following simple settings to broadly reflect the 
characteristics of the credit risk model under which EaD depends on a firm’s asset value. 
First, we break down the continuous time model into a discrete time model with two 
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assume that additional loan demand might occur six months later in a stochastic manner. 
The maturity dates for the liabilities at the initial time and for the loans drawn down on 
the commitment line are all one year later. We now proceed to calculate the values of 
PD, ELGD (expected LGD), EL, and UL through a Monte Carlo simulation under the 
above assumptions. 
Before conducting the simulation, we set values for the parameters other than  + D  and 
− D  in equations (2) and (4), initial asset value ( 0 A ) and initial liabilities ( 0 E ), using 
annual data from 1979 to 2006 for nonfinancial corporations under the Flow of Funds 
Statistics. First, we set  0 A   = 100 and  0 E   = 70 based on the average capital ratio 
throughout the full period. The time series of this ratio generally shows fluctuation 
within the range of 20%− 50%. We do not assume any specific scenario on the current 
condition in the ratio such as heightened debt leverage, so average values are used. Next, 
for the parameters in equation (2), we compute the average and variance of the annual 
ratio series for total assets and set the values at µ = 5%,  1 σ  = 10%. Finally for the 
parameters in equation (4) we scale the 1979 liabilities at 70 and set the values at b = 2, 
2 σ  = 7 based on the average and variance of the liabilities annual difference series.  
Under these parameter settings, however, the one-year PD becomes extremely low at 
0.003%.
8 Because the model characteristics can be interpreted more easily from the 
simulation results, we assume an enterprise with a somewhat high PD and set  1 σ  at 
20% higher than the original one of 10%. The values of the other parameters remain as 
stated above. With these settings, the PD becomes 2.7%, which generally corresponds to 
PDs for firms with a BB bond rating. 
The credit limit on the commitment line is set at 20, and interest earnings for the bank 
are not considered in the credit risk analysis. The simulation is conducted 200,000 times 
to stabilize the calculation results. 
 
(1) Case when  0 = − D  
First we examine the case where the value of parameter  − D  is zero. Chart 5 shows 
the simulation results for the expected value of the new loan amount, PD, ELGD, EL, 
                                                 
8 On a global basis, this is around the level of PD for corporate bonds with a rating of AA.   17
and UL. The horizontal axis of the graph shows the measurement for the covenants, that 
is, the capital ratio (in percent).
9 
UL is calculated as follows. We assume a single-factor Merton model
10 under the 
assumption that the bank’s credit portfolio is well diversified; in other words, the 
amount of credit to any given borrower is sufficiently small in the overall portfolio. UL 
is calculated by subtracting the value of EL from the value of EL under stress (stressed 
EL), hereafter, “SEL”. We also assume a confidence level of 99.9% for the common 
factor under stress, with  %) 9 . 99 (
1 − Φ − T . The correlation between the common factor 
and a firm’s asset value is  18 . 0 = R .
11 
In Chart 5 the covenants are assumed to be between − 50 and 50. Covenant values of 
around the initial capital ratio of 30% or a bit lower are considered realistic. Despite this, 
we boldly set the covenants over a wide range for the following reasons. First, negative 
values, i.e., capital deficits, are considered because the model does not consider default 
prior to the loan maturity during which firms may fall into negative net worth. 
Covenants above 30% are also considered to have the effect of setting strict covenants 
in cases when the bank does not allow further declines in a firm’s asset value with high 
credit risk or other more extreme cases when the banks provide a commitment line with 
a high commission expecting an increase in the firm’s capital.  
 
 
                                                 
9 In this paper, covenants refer to whether or not the capital ratio is less than α . For simplification, 
hereafter α  is referred to as “the covenants”. 
10 See, for example, Yamashita and Yoshiba [2007] for the single-factor Merton models and the 
definition of UL. 
11 Under the Basel II credit risk measurement for loans to nonfinancial corporations, parameter R 
must be set at 0.12~0.2, so here the intermediate value 0.18 is adopted.    18










































































Next, we explain the changes in each risk parameter. We review the simulation results 
in the three broad categories of covenants levels: (i) the standard setting range of 
0%− 30%; (ii) a very loose setting of 0% or less; and (iii) a strict setting of 30% and 
above. 
Increases in exposure 
(i) 0%− 30% 
The expected value of the increase in exposure is more than six and less than eight, 
and the liabilities increase by about 10% from their initial value of 70. The increase 
is more or less constant at a level less than 10% of covenants, indicating that the 
existence of the covenants does not restrict the increase in exposure in the range. 
(ii) 0% or less 
The covenants are not a constraint, and the new loan demand is just below eight. 
The new exposure figure depends on the probability of improvement in a firm’s asset 
value  t A  through equation (4) with 0 = − D . 
(iii) 30% and above 
Because there are a large number of cases in the simulation where the covenants 
prevent new loan withdrawal, the mean increase in exposure declines as the 
covenants become strict. 
Changes in PD 
Under Merton-type structural models, the liability ratio determines PD. In other 
words, PD rises as debt leverage is utilized. This can be explained with equations as 
follows. 
Just before the commitment line loan is drawn down, the firm’s asset value is A, the 

















− − Φ = ,  (5)
where Φ  is a distribution function of a normal distribution. It is clear that when the 
other parameters in equation (5) are fixed, PD is determined by the liability ratio  A E / .   20
We now consider the influence of the new loan on PD. When the amount of the new 




















Φ = .  (6)
This shows that PD rises (falls) because of the commitment line loan when the liability 
ratio ) /( ) ( E A E E ∆ + ∆ +  rises  (falls)  from  A E / . Regardless of the amount of the 
commitment line loan, the liability ratio will increase whenever the loan is drawn in the 
case of net positive assets ( A E < ), and decrease whenever the loan is drawn in the case 
of excess debt ( A E > ). We now examine the changes in PD among different covenants 
levels. 
(i) 0%− 30% 
In the case of net assets, new loans always raise PD, but borrowing is restricted as 
the covenants become more severe. For that reason, PD is a decreasing function of 
the covenants level. 
(ii) 0% or less 
PD remains more or less constant at 2.9%. In a theoretical sense, (1) in the case of 
excess debt, commitment line loans reduce PD, and (2) making the covenants more 
severe weakens this effect, so PD is an increasing function of the covenants level, 
opposite to (i). As discussed above in the examination of exposure, however, the 
covenants is not a binding condition for new loan withdrawal, so the effect of (2) is 
extremely small, and on Chart 5 PD is observed to be essentially flat. 
(iii) 30% and above 
Because the severe covenants restrict loan withdrawal, PD declines following the 
above-mentioned effect and ultimately converges to 2.7% when no new loans are 
made. 
Changes in ELGD 
ELGD remains constant at 0.07 regardless of the covenants level. Because ELGD has 
a low sensitivity to the amount of new loans, this has almost no influence on ELGD, 
even if new loans are restricted by covenants. An intuitive explanation is as follows.   21
ELGD is calculated as the conditional expected value  ] | / 1 [ T T T T E A E A E < − . Here 
T T E A ,  respectively represent the firm’s asset value and the liabilities at maturity, and 
the  T T E A /   distribution determines ELGD. The  T T E A /   distribution in logarithmic 



















ʙ .  (7)
Because  ) /( ) ln( E E E A ∆ + ∆ +   has little sensitivity to  E ∆  and  the  ) / ln( T T E A  
distribution is not influenced significantly by  E ∆ , ELGD remains essentially constant 
regardless of the covenants level. An explanation using differential calculations is 
presented as the Appendix. 
Changes in EL 
EL is approximately equal to the product of EaD, PD, and ELGD. Because ELGD is 
essentially constant as stated above, the change in EL is roughly explained by the 
changes in EaD and PD. However, to be precise, because all three variables follow 
distributions with correlations in the credit risk model, EL is not actually determined as 
the product of EaD, PD, and ELGD. Thus, to calculate EL, we calculate the expected 
loss through the simulation. While it is inappropriate to interpret EL as the product of 
the three variables, that approach is adopted here so that the interpretation is easy. 
(i) 0%− 30% 
EL gradually declines, mostly from the decline in PD. The effect of the decrease in 
EaD also contributes to the decline in EL. 
(ii) 0% or less 
Because EaD and PD are essentially constant, EL also remains constant at around 
0.15. 
(iii) 30% and above 
The decline in EL is even gentler than that for (i). This is because while EaD 
suddenly declines, the decline in PD is limited. PD influences EL via existing 
exposure as well as new loan exposure. Ultimately EL converges to 0.12 when no 
new loans are made.   22
Changes in SEL 
(i) 0%− 30% 
SEL is a decreasing function of the covenants. This is because if exposure is 
restrained by the covenants during the loan term period, SEL can be reduced even if 
a stress event occurs at maturity. SEL declines by 0.1 from covenants 0% to 30%. 
This is largely greater than the 0.01 decline in EL, demonstrating that the covenants 
have a greater effect on SEL than on EL. 
(ii) 0% or less 
Because the increase in exposure and PD are essentially constant, SEL is also flat. 
Because the covenants do not restrict an increase in exposure, SEL takes a maximum 
value.  
(iii) 30% and above 
Similar to EL, the size of the decline in SEL is gradual compared with (i). 
Furthermore, the area where the curve is convex is further to the right compared with 
EL. This is because the decline in EaD has a stronger influence on SEL than on EL. 
Ultimately SEL converges to 0.95 when there are no new loans. 
As for UL (= SEL – EL), because the variations in EL are less than those in SEL, UL 
has essentially the same shape as SEL. 
 
(2) Cases where  − D  is − 1 or − 2 
Thus far we have assumed that  0 = − D , where no loan demand arises from declines 
in a firm’s asset value. We now investigate the changes in risk when  − D  is − 1 or − 2 
assuming “increased borrowings following a decline in a firm’s asset value”, which 
poses higher risk to banks. Here, the settings of all the parameters other than  − D  are left 
unchanged to observe the influence from changes in  − D . Chart 6 presents the 
simulation results. 
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Increases in exposure 
When  − D  is decreased from 0 to − 1 to − 2, the increase in exposure rises because 
greater funds demand arises when a firm’s asset value declines. In the case of no upper 
limit to the commitment line, the increase in exposure becomes a linear function of  − D  
from the settings of equation (4). In Chart 6, on the other hand, the increase in the case 
of  − D ’s shifts from − 1 to − 2 is less than in the case from 0 to − 1. This is because in the 
simulation there are cases where new loans are restricted by the limit of the commitment 
line, and this reduces the average EaD. 
When the covenants are set within the range of 0%–30%, the area where the increase 
in exposure begins to decelerate is around 20% when  − D  is 0 and around 0% when  − D  
is − 1. This indicates that when  1 − = − D  and the covenants are loose, there is a large risk 
that the bank will not be able to restrain increased new loan demand. In contrast, when 
the covenants level approaches 30% exposure is almost the same regardless of the value 
of  − D , because the loan demand is suppressed by the covenants when a firm’s asset 
value declines. This shows that the relationship between covenants and increases in 
exposure can change greatly depending on the value of  − D , and suggests the 
importance of setting the covenants at an appropriate level. 
Changes in PD 
PD rises as  − D  becomes smaller. The maximum differential of PDs between 0 and − 2 
for  − D  is nearly 1%. PD grows larger as  − D  declines for the following reasons. 
New loan demand arises irrespective of whether a firm’s asset value increases or 
decreases six months later, but firms hold positive net assets in many cases. In this case, 
the liabilities ratio that determines PD rises along with the increase in new loans. As the 
negative value of  − D  declines, the increases in the new loan and the liabilities ratio 
become greater. For that reason, PD rises because of declines in  − D . 
When  − D  is − 1 or − 2, PD suddenly rises as the covenants level decreases from 20% 
to 0%. Because EaD and PD have a strong positive correlation under a relaxed 
covenants setting, credit risk increases significantly. When the covenants are set higher 
than around 25%, however, PD becomes constant regardless of the value of  − D  because 
an increase in exposure due to a decline in the firm’s asset value is restricted.   25
Changes in ELGD 
ELGD remains nearly constant at 0.07 regardless of the value of  − D  and  the 
covenants. When the covenants are lax, intuitively ELGD would be expected to rise 
when large funds demand arises from declines in a firm’s asset value. However, as long 
as the assumptions that assets and liabilities rise equally from new loans and that the 
geometric Brownian motion parameter in equation (2) remains constant hold true, under 
the framework of the Merton-type structural model, ELGD is barely influenced by the 
covenants setting, similar to the case of when  0 = − D . See the Appendix for the reason. 
The gap between simulation results and intuition suggests the possibility that these two 
assumptions may not hold.
12 
Changes in EL and UL 
When the covenants are 30% or less, EaD and PD both rise from the decline in  − D , 
and thus EL and UL both increase significantly. In particular, UL more easily rises 
because SEL expands nonlinearly against the change in  − D . In Chart 6, SEL is only 
restricted because the limit of the commitment line is set at 20, and there is great 
potential credit risk under easy commitment line provision and lax covenants especially 
when  − D  is negative. 
 
(3) Optimal covenants setting 
Up to this point, because the analysis has assumed no loan interest income, banks are 
able to reduce EL (always positive) by setting strict covenants. When interest earnings 
are considered for valuation of expected loss, however, another argument emerges; the 
optimal covenants level exists to maximize the total return composed of (i) higher 
                                                 
12  For example, even when a firm has worsening performance, at the moment of new loan 
withdrawal, it remains as cash in the firm’s balance sheet. Consequently, the assumption that assets 
and liabilities rise equally when new loans are drawn is feasible. In reality, however, it is entirely 
possible that the asset may deteriorate from the moment this cash is used for the firm’s activities. In 
that case the firm’s asset value does not increase by the amount of the new loan. Then, ELGD 
increases because the numerator of  ) /( ) ( E E E A ∆ + ∆ +  in equation (7) decreases. 
Over a somewhat longer timeframe, it is also possible that the cash borrowed by firms with 
worsened performance may not be used effectively. In that case, the growth rate of the firm’s asset 
value, µ, may be said to have declined during the period. Thus, a possible approach to avert this 
kind of problem is to set µ as a function of the firm’s asset value.   26
interest earnings from the increase in loan amount and (ii) higher expected loss at 
default because of the increase in loan amount. In this section we examine this trade-off 
assuming that banks act to maximize their expected revenues including the expected 
loss.
13 
We now examine the optimal covenants level using simulations. The simulation 
settings are as follows. Banks provide new loans at a previously determined interest rate 
r . The bank’s funding cost is  f r . The initial liability amount  0 E  and the new loan 
amount  E ∆  are stated at face value. In other words, the amounts that the firm actually 
borrows are discounted by lending rates.
14 The simulation parameter settings are the 
same as for the case  0 = − D , and r is set at 3%. Simulations are conducted for the two 
cases when  f r  is 1% and 2%. 
Under the above settings, the expected revenues π  are: 
] ) [( ) 1 ]( [ ) 1 ( 0
) ( ) (
0
+ − − − ∆ + − − ∆ + − = T
r r T r r A E E E e E E e E
f f τ π ,  (8)
where τ   is the time from the draw down of the commitment line to maturity. The 
simulation results are presented in Chart 7. 
 









                                                 
13 Another approach would be to consider the profit risk trade-off for risk calculated using UL. For 
simplification, we assume risk-neutral banks. 
14 These settings are to simplify the expression of revenues as defined in equation (8), and whether 















Funding rate of 1% (left scale)
Funding rate of 2% (right scale)
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The expected revenues are positive when there is a spread to some extent between the 
lending rate and funding rate. The optimal covenants level is 30% when the funding rate 
is 2% and 25% when the funding rate is 1%, which suggests that optimal covenants are 
not lower than 30% of the initial capital ratio. When the funding rate is 1%, the volume 
effect of the increased exposure exceeds the negative influence of increased credit risk, 




This paper has constructed a credit risk model for stochastic changes in exposure and 
applied it to evaluate credit risk of commitment lines. Loans under commitment lines 
make it difficult for banks to manage risk appropriately, once such contracts are 
concluded and firms have an option to withdraw new loans. For that reason, the 
covenant conditions are important for risk management. We consider a model in which 
EaD, PD, and ELGD are mutually interdependent and a firm’s funds demand is 
explicitly linked to changes in its asset value. We apply the model to commitment lines, 
and calculate EL, UL, and other risk measurements. We also assume various degrees of 
covenants from relaxed to severe to examine the changes in EaD, PD, ELGD, EL, and 
UL and investigate their interdependence in simulations. 
The following points were verified quantitatively through the simulations. 
I.  Credit risk tends to increase with exposure to the firm whose new loan demand 
rises when its asset value declines. A positive correlation between EaD and PD in 
the model describes this result.  
II.  Covenants that prevent uncontrollable increases in exposure to poor performing 
firms are useful for limiting credit risk. In some cases, lax covenants can lead to 
greater losses, and this largely depends on the structure of how changes in a 
firm’s asset value leads to new loan demand.  
III. Consequently, verifying this structure is important for controlling credit risk 
when providing commitment lines and setting covenants. 
IV. There is a covenants level that optimizes the trade-off between the increase in   28
loan interest earnings and the increase in EL. 
Because individual companies’ commitment line data are not available, the 
examination of the suitability of the model and parameter settings in this paper is 
insufficient. Moreover, this paper adopts several simplified assumptions to understand 
the property of the model that generates mutual dependence among EaD, PD, and LGD. 
The following types of model extensions could be considered. These are left as future 
issues, along with the verification on the model based on empirical data. 
I.  The funds demand model sets  + D  and  − D  as constants, but it would enhance 
model applicability to make these parameters either functions of the firm’s asset 
value or stochastic variables. 
II.  The model assumes that new loan demand always occurs at a specific point, but 
the timing and the presence or absence of loan demand could also be incorporated 
into the model. 
III. The model could accommodate funds prepayment prior to maturity instead of 
having all refunded at maturity. 
IV. Funds demand is given as exogenous, but the model could be extended to make it 
an endogenous variable, for example, assuming the demand is determined to 
maximize shareholder value.   29
Appendix: Changes in ELGD from commitment line loansç
The ELGD for a new loan with a face value of X is given by the following equation: 
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We now calculate the first derivative to examine the sensitivity of ELGD to the 
amount of the new loan with a face value of X: 
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  (A-2) 
The numerator of equation (A-2) is modified as follows: 
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  (A-3) 
where ) (⋅ φ  is the density function of the standard normal distribution. 
From equation (A-3), the denominator of  X ELGD ∂ ∂ /   is far larger than the 
numerator, so a change in X leads to a small change in ELGD. The following chart 
shows the changes in ELGD when new loans are made under various firms’ asset value 
conditions. The parameter settings are the same as those for the case  0 = − D  in Chapter 
4. The chart shows little change in ELGD regardless of the new loan amount. In other 
words, there is little influence on ELGD even when new lending is restrained by 
covenants.    30
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